Panjab - lessons to be learnt

The state of Panjab, in Northern India, experienced a period of intense agricultural modernisation, for many years it was a success story of the Green Revolution. Panjab's agricultural scene is dominated by primarily small scale farmers, having not experienced the large scale land acquisitions that Africa faces. In recent decades however, the Green Revolution of Panjab has faced considerable backlash on several fronts: high levels of indebtedness, deterioration of water supply, rapidly lowering water table and soil degradation to name a few. The problems being experienced in Panjab could help guide mitigation strategies in Africa, or at the very least prepare farmers for the possible consequences of the Green Revolution.

The issues facing Panjab are legion. They cannot all be listed here, but the following provide a snapshot of what Panjab has been experiencing.

Owing to the existence of a land-owning caste in Panjab, land titling has been established, in some form, for a long time. This helped to facilitate the introduction of the Green Revolution, as land titling is encouraged to make countries more attractive to foreign investment (De Schutter, 2011). Panjabi farmers also have considerable access to credit, and routinely leverage their land to obtain it. However, they typically receive unfavourable terms and may still be forced to rely on non-institutional sources of credit (local lenders). The use of land for debt-financing by farmers has been identified as a serious problem in Panjab (Singh et al., 2014), with the consequences going so far as farmers committing suicide. Institutions such as the World Bank espouse the idea that a land market would see land reallocated to those most in need of it or who can make best use of it - this idea is naive. Land is and will be allocated to those with the greatest access to capital. A commercialising of the access to land and water is and has been to the detriment of traditional communities and livelihoods.

The ecology and personal health of farmers have also greatly suffered, as Vandana Shiva details in 'The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology, and Politics' (2016). The intense use of fertilisers and pesticides, without the proper safety equipment, has seen significant leaching into water sources, including the groundwater reserves that are heavily relied upon for irrigation. The increase in toxicity also poses serious health concerns for humans and livestock, with dangerously elevated levels of fluorine, boron, selenium and aluminium (Rahman, 2015).

Conflicts over water are common, as demand continues to outstrip supply. The construction of dams has also been required in order to sustain water levels for irrigation, with such infrastructure potentially necessary in a "greened" Africa.

Pressures from loan repayments, increasing costs of living and low value of crops drive excessive cultivation of the land and over abstraction. The demand for fertile land for agriculture has perversely resulted in rapid land degradation, with 'land scarcity' accompanying the water scarcity.

The Green Revolution in Panjab has forced intense competition. Despite the lack of land acquisitions, Panjabi farming has still resulted in intense and unsustainable practices. Many of the attributes of the Green Revolution in Africa have helped to drive the situation in Panjab - access to credit, access to better farming technology, better seeds, increased farm yields. It follows therefore that we should avoid fetishizing smallholder farming as some sort of impermeable barrier to exploitation.

If more can be grown, more must be grown - this idea could very well transpire throughout Africa. If it cannot realistically be mitigated against, then Africans must decide whether it is an acceptable potential consequence.

Is Agriculture an Acceptable Platform for Development?

Irrigated land in Africa still only accounts for 6% of total cultivated land. The Green Revolution would look to change that, and it has steadily developed increasing support, especially within Africa itself. This gives it the required political momentum, but does not guarantee that it will be beneficial for most Africans, and nor does it guarantee that African nations will resist opportunities for even greater intensification. Indeed, there are already countries in Africa experiencing an intensification in agriculture.

The Green Revolution proposes transforming smallholder agriculture with improved technologies, better seeds, increased access to credit etc. The vision is for an African-centric, African-led initiative that guides agriculture in Africa. By removing foreign, for-profit, large scale actors that "take over" land, the Green Revolution attempts to better the chances of sustainable development. As the people working on and living the land are also the ones that make the decisions for it. This may sound delightfully idyllic, but a target should be.

This article from the Harvard Business Review is optimistic of the opportunities to come. Highlighting the 'inclusive growth' of current agricultural development in Africa, the article notes that the African Development Bank has grown to surpass the World Bank in 2008 as the biggest lender to Africa. The inclusive growth, a key point of the African Green Revolution video I posted, would see far greater returns for Africa than a simple intensification of agriculture without an overarching plan for the resultant revenue and goods. This would establish a better balance of returns for African countries and people than has been the case in previous decades (as discussed in previous posts).

Africa presents key issues that were not necessarily present in the same way in previous Green Revolutions however. Donald Larson of the World Bank contends that Africa presents a far more heterogeneous agricultural profile than Asia, where there were only two principle crops - rice and wheat. This complexity would undoubtedly make it harder to coordinate agricultural practices and development. Further, the groundwater profile of Africa is incomplete (MacDonald et al., 2013), and this may limit the scale or the sustainability of intensive agriculture.

In parts of Northern Africa, the groundwater dates back thousands of years, and so abstraction of water from those aquifers should be treated more akin to 'mining' the fossil water. Other parts of Africa however have decadal recharge timescales, and can be more easily monitored to track (over)abstraction. However, as Africa's population continues to increase, and urbanisation and increased living standards inevitably demand more water, the loss of large amounts of groundwater to intensive agriculture may present a serious problem. These groundwater reserves can act as 'buffers' against climatic variance (Calow et al., 2010), which is only expected to increase: and so increased stress on groundwater reserves would carry greater risk of water shortages, whilst perversely fuelling greater growth and thus demand.

Agriculture around the world is supported by state intervention, from EU and US subsidies to minimum support prices in India. There is consistent pressure to drive prices down, and as the purchasers of this food can pick from nations around the world, each country reliant on agriculture is forced to keep prices aggressively low. Kaplinsky (2005) highlights these 'declining terms of trade' for producers in the global supply chain. Africa is constantly picked out as an area of "under utilisation", a "final frontier" for agriculture. Once/If agriculture is intensified on a large scale across Africa, and the boom is over, might businesses flee before African economies have the chance to move on from agriculture?

There are many other risks and questions raised when allowing so much of the African economy to be linked to the Green Revolution. The manufacturing, services and technology sectors are all viewed in higher regard (for good reason) than agriculture. Would establishing Africa as the premier agricultural hub do much to elevate Africa to the levels of developing and developed parts of the world? Does this continue to hold Africa on the lower rungs of the global economy? This is touted as the necessary future of agriculture; could Africa adopt such an advanced image of agriculture with smallholder farmers, and if so, could it retain the necessary wealth to sustain inclusive growth, or would this hand power back to the developed nations? All of these questions require speculation, and there is little data, quantitative or qualitative, to make such predictions about the future.

Agriculture is by no means risk-free, but nor does it need to be. Intensive farming has obvious connotations of unsustainable farming, but the Green Revolution for Africa proposes a model where smallholder farmers are enabled and empowered. There is not the forced, intense pressure of intensive farming, with necessary overuse of water reserves. And if the gains from the Green Revolution can be internalised, it would help to provide some shelter to the continent from excessive foreign influence. There is indeed a vision of inclusive development and responsible water management that can be met by agriculture. 

Next week I'll be looking at an example of smallholder agriculture from Panjab. It provides an example of an agrarian economy that already has the land titling that is to be expected in Africa in the future.

Green Economy

I was suggested a book by Professor Taylor, the Handbook of Land and Water Grabs in Africa, you may have noticed I drew on sources from that book in my previous posts. I thoroughly recommend it for those interested in land acquisitions and, crucially, its implications for water security in Africa. There is one chapter in particular that has caught my interest, and it ties in well to the recent discussions on this blog: Land and water grabs and the green economy, by Martin Keulertz.

Keulertz argues that fundamentally the nature of current economic philosophy is not geared towards a green economy - that being the system of economic activities that result in improved human well-being over the long term without exposing future generations to significant environmental risks. Keulertz applies the theory of Kondratiev Waves (referred to as Kondratieff economic cycle theory in the chapter), claiming that we are in a current period of creative destruction, where excess and slow-moving companies are outpaced by innovation. With the view that neoliberal practises will mismanage water resources and force a change in paradigm, a green economy will be established where land rights may be properly respected and water properly managed.

I'd argue however that it presents an overly simplistic assessment of what is happening, and rather wishful in its hopes for the future. Whilst there may be changes in the neoliberal order, there is nothing to genuinely suggest that a green economy will be established. A green economy fundamentally requires a sustainable and long-term outlook, which empowers all actors to ensure well-being is improved. Such a shift in power, away from the economic and political elites, would require seismic change. Even if renewable energy becomes the norm and we reduce plastic consumption etc., there is nothing to suggest that such movements would begin to spread wealth away from banks, institutional investors (including pension funds) and the elite. There is little to suggest that companies will write-off investments and risk losing their shareholders to give the farmers of Africa a better deal with sustainable farming. The creative destruction that is referred to has been seen countless times, with the shift from CDs, to MP3 players to now streaming being a good example (Warf, 2013). But these instances of innovation have, ultimately, been guided (and funded) by the drive for more profit.

Once the premise of a change in the global order is accepted, the arguments put forth can be accepted and a green economy appears to be a reality - a rather pleasant one. But the premise does not stand, it merely bears the hallmarks of the countless theories that have proposed the imminent collapse of capitalism and the ushering in of a fairer world. I propose that it is more positive, and better for those in need, to deal with the reality of power imbalances and privileges at hand. I agree with Keulertz that there will come a point when decisions must be made that better manage water, but that does not mean they will necessarily conform to the ideals of the green economy, which sets a particularly high bar.


In my next post, I will move further from the topic of Land Acquisitions, and begin exploring agriculture, particularly in the context of managing water resources, and African position on the global political stage. 

Are the Land Acquisitions all about Water?

Much of the literature on Land Acquisitions have focused on the link to water, asserting that these acquisitions are intended to secure water for the investor-nation. Hall (2011: 194) states that 'China, India, South Korea and the Gulf States are among those at the forefront of this agricultural expansion, as they seek to produce food overseas for their growing populations'. These land deals are claimed to facilitate a virtual water trade, as countries try to manage their water consumption through outsourcing.

However, I came across this relatively recent study by Breu et al. (2016) which contends that in many cases, the investor countries engage in agricultural practises abroad that are less intensive than their domestic crop production. They also found that net global water use decreases when these land acquisitions are used. Conversely, the paper also notes that certain key investors, such as the US and Saudi Arabia (the only one of the Gulf states that shows this trait), are indeed 'externalising crop water consumption' through these land acquisitions. Crucially, the study found that water use intensity did increase in the host countries.

Whilst the study states that these findings suggest water is not always the key determinant behind land acquisitions, the fact that water use intensity was found to increase in the host nations still establishes the potentially negative consequences of land acquisitions. On a global scale, it may be a smart use of water resources, but on the African country scale, it does not necessarily bode well for development.

Why are Land Acquisitions not Development focused (Part 2)?

Continuing on from the previous week's post...

What is apparent across the literature on corporate and state investment in land acquisitions is a dehumanising of the African continent into another notch in a portfolio, or a matter of strategy. Such behaviour is enabled by distance (Held et al. 1999). The physical distance between the investor and "investment" against the relative ease with which money and technology can flow across space, results in a relationship that, on a human level, is rather callous. This dehumanising is not conducive to development, as development requires an appreciation for the individual. The displaced nature of TNCs, and the distant policymakers of foreign countries, create privileged relationships in which the land and water users in Africa are seen only as a vehicle for profit/loss (Hawthorne, 2004).

There is little appreciation for the externalities (an externality being the cost or benefit that affects a party who did not choose to incur that cost or benefit) of their business, beyond the need to keep things going without farmer revolt or government retaliation. Degradation of soil and water quality, as is typically evidenced in intensive farming (Tilman et al., 2002), disproportionately harms the host nation on timescales that TNCs are unlikely to worry about. Further, the use of water for agri-industrial processes typically threatens the water supply of surrounding communities. It would require significant government oversight to keep this all from resulting in unsustainable and exploitative practises, but such oversight has yet to be seen (Cotula et al., 2009), and is unlikely when host nations are so reliant on foreign direct investment, and such investment is needed across a nation's economy (Allan, 2013). Indeed, land acquisitions make full use of government subsidies and offtake agreements (Woertz, 2013).

With the process of intense globalisation experienced over the past century, there has been an intensification of the divide between rich and poor countries (Dicken, 2007). As suppliers have been brought into the global supply chain, they have typically (with a few exceptions) been exposed to increased risks but only received a fraction of the profits, with the wealth gap exponentially increasing between the richest and poorest nations (see Figure 1).  Even if land acquisitions yield absolute gains for the host country, the intense inequality in that trade does not allow for it to be genuine development. It's a very small slice of a rather large pie.

Fig. 1 Widening income gap between countries

The terms of land acquisitions so far have been too heavily in favour of the investor. Development would not require an equal split between investor and host nation (that would be extremely unlikely), but an ever-increasing gap between rich and poor is simply unjust. Thus, the income inequality is indisputable and the intensive agricultural practices are of questionable sustainability. Land acquisitions have thus far not fit even the broad definition of development being used. They would require that host nations to gain far more from the agreements in order for them to be truly mutually beneficial.

Why are Land Acquisitions not Development focused (Part 1)?

A note before we begin, I am not arguing that land acquisitions cannot in any way be positive or yield any good, and nor am I arguing that there is no form of land acquisition that is pro-development. What is being discussed are land acquisitions up to this point, which have been dominated by state actors and major corporations.

To begin this two-part post I'll first discuss development. As has already been brought up in the blog, the question of development is itself a complex one. There is no single model for development, with the path of the United Kingdom being distinct from the Four Asian Tigers (Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong) and those paths being distinct from the superpowers-in-waiting: China and India. Further, the actual end point of development can also be contested. If the lifestyles of countries such as the US and the UK are unsustainable, and racked with increasing inequality and poorer wage outlooks, can we hold them up as goals to work towards?

These are important questions with serious ramifications for African countries and their paths for the years to come. It would, however, be impractical to attempt a definitive answer to these questions, even if the entire blog was devoted to it! For the purposes of this post, I'll broadly define development as a move towards reducing inequalities (of income, education, health etc.), growing sustainable industries and increasing standards of living. Even these definitions generate serious questions (is any industry within a capitalist system sustainable?), but there must be a starting point, and I believe these definitions are sufficient to interrogate land acquisitions and reasonably uncontroversial (see Figure 1 for the relationship between human development and inequalities).

Fig. 1 More human development is associated with less inequality

Transnational Corporations (or TNCs) have previously been mentioned. These corporations have a significant stake in land acquisitions across Africa, with a focus on agri-industrial developments. These acquisitions use the water of the African country to produce crops, principally food, and largely for export. So why would TNCs serve to entrench inequalities, as opposed to break them down in pro-poor development? Each individual case will undoubtedly vary, and there are certainly many case studies to explore if one is interested in a particular incident. But I'd argue that, on a fundamental level, TNCs entrench inequalities because they function in an unequal system with the ever-present requirement to grow. Companies have a duty to their shareholders, on whom they are reliant. That duty involves maximising the returns to their shareholders, if they (or, crucially, their competitors) can reduce their costs, they must do so. Owing to the power relations between a TNC and farmers in Africa, the relationship will always be to the detriment of the farmer.

TNCs however are not the only foreign direct investors on African land. State actors are also heavily involved, with particular interest from the Gulf States, Asian states and Western investors (Woertz, 2013). The Gulf countries have been securing international land for the strategic purpose of food security, with Africa identified as a continent with considerable opportunity for agricultural growth. In effect, these investments secure access to water that is in short supply in the Gulf, which is then used to cultivate the land and export that food back to the investor. These countries are attempting to reduce the risk of food shortages in any future crises, after several scares in the previous decades where money was not enough to secure sufficient food. Again, the aim of the investment is not geared towards development.

Next week I will continue to explore these inherently unequal land acquisitions, looking at what macroeconomic trends suggest about the relationships.

An African Green Revolution

Whilst looking further into the question of land grabs, agriculture and water, I stumbled upon this video about a Green Revolution in Africa, a movement that I mentioned in an earlier post.

It's produced by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) - they are an African organisation (and I think the fact that they themselves are African is important) who typically focus on issues such as arms control and criminal justice. But it was interesting to see them include research carried out into food - showing just how important a topic this is considered. 

The video provides some interesting figures (I'm sure there are plenty of caveats and rebuttals but it still gets you thinking!) and ultimately decides on a development-focused plan for the future. Whether water is or is not given as much significance as food in their modelling is also quite telling; I haven't yet had the chance to look into this myself.

Regardless of what you think about their vision, ISS Africa is a major NGO, founded, and always on the ground, in Africa. Their opinion is influential, and their approach to development is likely to affect water management strategies.

Definitely food for thought!

Water Security and Foreign Investment

When writing my last post I was reminded of the recent discussions surrounding foreign investment in critical infrastructure, specifically Chinese investment in the UK's Hinkley Point C project and Australia's energy grid. The UK is now making moves to change its approach to investment in these key areas (Clifford Chance, 2016).

Land deals in Africa, and foreign investment in general, may introduce another layer of water insecurity to the already complex picture. Control, or at the very least intimate knowledge, of a country's agricultural systems and water infrastructure could present serious concerns for African governments.

Land Deals - the good, the bad and the necessary?

The variegated nature of land deals in Africa means land grabbing is too broad a term. There are considerable differences between the land, the people and the terms of the deals in question (Hall, 2011). I will thus refrain from using the phrase 'grabbing', as I believe it hinders a more thorough exploration of land acquisition deals and what they mean for water management.

Water cannot be viewed in isolation. The wider economic and societal implications of land acquisitions must be understood in order to inform a holistic (and realistic) water management scheme.

Quoting research by Rulli and D'Odorico, Pearce (2014) states that on the total global area of land acquired or in the process of being acquired, 300-550 million people could be fed through the use of modern farming techniques, compared to 190-370 million through traditional techniques. Whilst this is a crude figure - there are serious concerns about the sustainability of modern techniques in all these areas, the destination of the food grown, the use of that land for produce other than food - it is important to keep in mind throughout this post the potential of that land. There are many questions to be asked about land acquisition, and a distinct lack of answers. Studies in hindsight will undoubtedly establish "frameworks" and "best practise" guidelines, but for the decisions being made now, the issues of practicalities and principles are legion.

Even the phrase "land acquisition" implies purchasing of land, when in fact the trend is for land to be leased (Cotula et al., 2009 - see Figure 1). Furthermore, these land deals introduce expertise and technology alongside capital. This naturally carries the risk of local knowledge being lost, however, ignoring proven advances in agriculture equally carries risk. Encouraging/enforcing sharing of local knowledge could help ensure investor practises on the land have a lower risk of compromising water availability. There is considerable opportunity for technologies and expertise to develop within individual nations as a result of this investment, contributing to the development of water use infrastructure elsewhere in the country. Land and labour would therefore be traded for capital, technology and expertise.

Fig 1 Type of land rights transferred - "Other" in Mali and Madagascar refers to projects involving contract farming or land distribution arrangements.

Land deals also carry with them opportunity costs (Schutter, 2011), as land is not developed with the aim of poverty-reduction or responsible consumption. Further, the reduction of land to commodity-status could also negatively affect the culture of those that use it. Land can and does hold intrinsic value. Indeed, buildings and areas of land are protected in the UK under all manner of listings. It is not an overly romanticised view of the land, but a recognition of the importance of culture, and a people's relationship to their surroundings. Large-scale land deals also massively reduce the freedom of individuals whose livelihood is linked to that land. Their choices are restricted and shaped by the opportunities investors choose to create.

In response to calls for a Code of Conduct to shape land deals, Borras and Franco argue that:

any effort to link high standards of business practice with ethical behaviour in (trans)national land deals is unlikely to produce truly pro-poor outcomes if the primary aim of the land transfer is not categorically to protect and advance the land-access and property interests of working poor people. (2010: 510)

The argument follows that the root causes of poverty issues are not linked to economic development, but a 'TNC-controlled global system' (ibid). It may be argued therefore that a departure from this system is necessary to allow responsible water management decisions to be made. So long as profit is driving decisions within a global, capitalist system, it is not possible to have inclusive decision-making that includes all stakeholders. The power relations of our current political standard do not allow for environmental and societal protections, but rather the finances of an elite. 

Transnational corporations are not natural vehicles for poverty reduction. And the wholesale leasing of land for large-scale agri-industrial projects is unlikely to be the ideal development strategy - especially for the development of water access and security. Corporations - or rather, the pursuit of profit and power - does not have a good track record with equitable development. However, some deals may indeed increase standards of living and create water management solutions that are better suited to the growing populations of many African countries.  Even in developed countries, the struggle of keeping corporations in check is ever-present. Over the 20th century, when industrial jobs were exported and the UK's economy shifted to be far more financialised, there were considerable losses. To this day we struggle to control the excesses and transgressions of the current economy. I argue however that few, if any, would wish education standards, health services and infrastructure to revert to that of the 20th century. Is there an example of such development, water security and food security without the move from traditional, low-output agriculture? 

Africa's a vastly varied continent, and there may be instances within it where the pro-poor development opportunities that Borras and Franco call for may be possible, isolated from the wider capitalist hegemony. But it is not plausible for the African continent to insulate itself from international influence or reliance. If the inequalities and inequities of the world are accepted, and water management strategies are drawn up within this reality, then land deals are likely to be necessary and inevitable. The water and food security that we enjoy in the UK and in other developed countries has required compromise. Surely then it is not right to deny or discourage similar development in other countries because of our uncompromising stance.

The issue of land deals is not therefore just one of transnational corporations vs the people. I contend that it is far more difficult and nuanced. It requires choosing between different visions of development - each with the aim of serving the people.

Land Grabbing?

In reading the literature I have discovered far greater confusion and disagreement than I had anticipated. The link between land and water is obvious, indeed, literature refers specifically to the practise of "water grabbing" - with land deals used as a means of gaining access to freshwater resources (Rulli et al., 2012). I therefore would like to keep this post as short as possible, so that I can continue to explore land grabbing/acquisition throughout the blog. It would not be appropriate to force this complex topic into a single entry.

Land grabbing has been widely defined by researchers and NGOs. EJOLT (Environmental Justice Organisations, Liabilities and Trade) characterises land grabbing as including 'large scale displacement of the rural poor without proper compensation and the destruction of the local ecology to make space for industrial agriculture and biofuels' (EJOLT, 2014: 3). They, and others, stress that there is often private and foreign involvement, typically in the form of investment, with most of the profits flowing to other parts of the world. Where there is consensus across sources is that the land grabbing/acquisition process has been concentrated in Africa (see World Bank, 2010; EJOLT, 2014; Hall, 2011)

Land grabbing is fundamentally a pejorative term. It strongly implies exploitation and abuse of both systems and people. It is used most often by NGOs, who have their own interests and objectives; it is refuted and/or avoided by corporations, and institutions that back market-led solutions. The apparently widespread phenomenon of land grabbing has, however, been extensively challenged.

The European Union (EU) has been seen as a major source of demand for biofuels. ePURE (a European renewable ethanol lobby - based in Brussels) commissioned a consultancy, Ecofys, to look into the issue. Ecofys looked at Land Matrix's data - Land Matrix being an organisation set up to monitor global land acquisitions. Their data is often cited and relied upon, especially by organisations such as Oxfam (which is a financial supporter of the Land Matrix initiative), who have campaigned against what they perceive to be land grabbing. Ecofys (2013) could only confirm 35% of the deals in the sample, with only 1.4-7.6 Mha of the total 38.3 Mha of deals in the Land Matrix data being potentially related to biofuels (the lower end of that range is likely to be closer to the true value).

Cotula et al. state that 'data on land acquisitions in Africa is scarce and often of limited reliability' (2009: 3). The above example of biofuels shows the difficulty in assessing these deals. Both Land Matrix and Ecofys are working with incomplete data, looking at a topic scattered with secret deals. Some deals have failed - Madagascar's botched 1.3 Mha lease deal for example - some have fallen through after approval, and others have only been partially implemented (ibid), which only adds to the complexity of the issue. 

This post has hopefully shed some light on just how murky the world of land grabbing is. The agricultural focus of land grabbing means it has significant implications for water management, especially in the context of IRBM. Hesitation as a result of this uncertainty may be exploited by corporations for maximum gain; but overzealous action may detract legitimate, necessary and beneficial investment. In posts to come, I will explore this issue further, hopefully uncovering positive goals with realistic chances of success. 

North Africa

With a lot of attention given to the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa, it was interesting to come across this article looking at the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. So here’s a quick little post looking at an issue this article got me thinking about.

Water Scarcity: Cooperation or Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa?

The focus of my blog remains on Africa, but the relationship between North Africa and the Middle East is an important one and shouldn't be ignored.

North Africa presents a picture that in many ways is quite different to much of Sub-Saharan Africa. There is far greater ethnic homogeneity in the region and the GDP per capita of these countries (especially along the Mediterranean) is generally higher. Over the last few decades, the “War on Terror” and the “Arab Spring” have brought considerable foreign interest and engagement across the MENA. 

Ethnicity map of Africa

The article is hopeful and states that the MENA is moving more towards cooperation over conflict in the handling of water.

But the situation in the Middle East is highly volatile. Over this century, the place of oil in society is likely to change. And the growth of China is increasingly drawing the attention of the “West”. Foreign involvement in the Middle East is therefore likely to change, and the ambitions and finances of the Middle East will change with it.

These movements in the coming future should not be ignored when considering the water situation in North Africa. New alliances may be forged, both within the MENA and in other parts of the world. Whether North Africa looks south towards other African countries will have serious implications for water management.

Wider geopolitical movements and trends need to be considered when looking at the future of water management schemes. I’m not suggesting that we must predict the future, but we can’t be ignorant of the fact that change can and will happen. Hopefully in the weeks to come I can explore this issue further and see what the literature has to offer.

Hello and Welcome

Hello and welcome to my blog, Water and Politics. Over the following months I’ll be looking at the political issues surrounding Water and Development in Africa. This will include some past examples (both in Africa and, where relevant, from around the world), current discussions and views for the future. In this introduction I’ll introduce some of the ideas and topics that I will explore in greater detail in later posts, and hopefully uncover new areas for exploration.

When managing a resource as vital as water, there are a multitude of voices to be heard – each with its own insights, experiences and (potential) power. The political stage is where many, if not all, of these voices are heard. Some are put at the top of the pile, others at the bottom, and some voices are completely snuffed out. Politics is where the laws that enable land grabbing are carved out, the developments that dry the land are drawn up – it is the place where I believe you have the greatest opportunity to enact change and manage water effectively and fairly.

From approximately the latter half of the 20^th Century, in the aftermath of the World Wars, moves were made towards greater international cooperation, especially on the economic stage. Organisations including the United Nations, World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were founded. For the management of water, large-scale, highly visible, structural solutions were proposed and pushed through, with loans provided to many developing countries around the world (e.g. the Inga Dams). These policies have faced considerable criticism, with some arguing this forms part of a neo-colonialism, engineering a laissez-faire world structure that does little to help the world’s poor. Whether these policies were indeed a new system of control, and what lessons we can learn from them in the future of water management, will be covered in the weeks to come.

Big, top-down projects persist, and some indications suggest the mega dams of the past are enjoying a resurgence. However, since the 1990s, there is increasing emphasis on switching to Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM). This approach attempts to tick all of the right boxes: holistic, long-term, sustainable, inclusive, multi-sectoral, iterative etc.

The question remains however, of whether this is a politically viable approach.

• Is it being adopted by political parties?
• Can governments survive elections if their management plans are not as striking as the dams?
• Is there a pragmatic, real-world strategy for implementing and sustaining these plans in Africa?

Agriculture is a major user of water in Africa (and around the world). When commodity prices rose in 2008, there was a rush to buy land (some have labelled this land grabbing) in Africa in the hope of significant returns from future agricultural projects. These investments have brought considerable criticism (Cotula et al., 2011) on companies and governments for uprooting people and offering inadequate compensation. Alongside this, there is a drive for a Green Revolution in Africa (backed by major organisations like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation). All the while, smallholder farmers continue to form a large proportion of the agricultural activity in Africa.

The agricultural situation therefore is highly complicated, with contesting priorities on the local, national, regional and international scales. A “Green Revolution” may only give rise to larger, unsustainable farms (Blaustein, 2008). Smallholder farms, in the medium- to long-term, are not predicted to fair well against this competition (FAO, 2009). Large-scale, irrigated agriculture poses several risks, such as the pollution of groundwater sources (Agrawal et al., 1999). As has been seen in the Indo-Gangetic Basin (MacDonald et al., 2016), water quality, as well as quantity, must be seen as a key consideration. However, if the pressures and promises of “Western”-backed, considerably-sized investments have not been resisted in previous decades, a strategy must be proposed for resisting them now.

As stated in the beginning, this post is just an introduction to some of the considerations that must be made in the management of water in Africa. Alongside these considerations, I’ll try to explore whether the integrated, holistic, sustainable solutions that have been proposed, in all sectors, for so long, appear to have any real chance of continent-wide success. Are our current political, social and economic structures amenable to such solutions, or are they an impossibility on a large scale? Are the approaches of the World Bank, the IMF and others, whilst flawed, far more pragmatic?

Please feel free to comment, correct and challenge my posts!


List of References

Agrawal, G., Lunkad, S. And Malkhed, T. (1999). Diffuse agricultural nitrate pollution of groundwaters in India. Water Science and Technology, 39(3), pp.67-75.

Blaustein, R. (2008). The Green Revolution Arrives in Africa. BioScience, 58(1), p.8.

Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Mathieu, P. and Toulmin, C. (2011). Agricultural investment and international land deals: evidence from a multi-country study in Africa. Food Security, 3(S1), pp.99-113.

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